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THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT 
THROUGH THE LENS OF 
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL* 
Sh泊zoInouye料
Introduction 
The subject matter of the present paper is the North China In-
cid.ent From a macroscopic po担tof view, it c阻 beconsidered as阻
inevitable result of Japanese “imperialism，” which eventually led to 
出ePacific War From a nncroscopic pomt of View, however, it was an 
outcome of mterrelated decisions and actions of恒也vidualdecision-
makers who acted on behalf of the government Whichever approach 
may be taken, it is safe to say that the North China Incident was one 
of也emost sig凶白cantevents which aggrega~ed to the Pacific War. 
Incidentally, there are excellent works about this theme, such as 
T抽出')IO-sensoe no Michi (Vol. IV〕1and Nitchu-senso Shi,2 bo出 of
which fal 担 thesecond category. To the wnter's regret, however, 
出eyhave not systematically employed叩 yspecific framework of血e
foreign policy decision-making.百1estudy of diplomatic history should 
be wedded to血atof foreign policy decision-making. 
* The pages田signedto血ewriter cover only the first half of出eproposed study. 
The writer hop田 tohave由erest of it published soon on阻otherocc田ion.
帥 ShinzoInouye is四 Assist回tof International Relations, Social Science Re田町・ch
Institute, International Christi叩 University,Tokyo. 
I Nippon Kokusai seiji Gakkai, Taiheiyo・senso e no Michi (The Road to the Pacific 
War), Vol. IV (The China War I), Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1963 
2 Hata, Ikuhiko, Nitchu-senso Shi (The History of由eSino-Japanese War), Kawade 
Shobo Shinsha, 1972 
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τhe wnter, who is interested in the foreign policy decision-making 
出eory叩 dits application, will address himself恒也epresent paper to 
analyzing the North China Incident with the bureaucratic politics 
model,3 which conceiv＇回世田 t“whathappens is characterized as re-
sultant of vanous barg田runggames among players in the national 
govemment.”4 Tl由 model,the writer believes, is highly relevant to 
也epresent case First，吐1emodel has its advantage to analyze the 
act10ns of血epre-war Japanese dec!Slon-making system which Prof. 
Hosoya calls “truncated pyramid" system' , in which the decision-
makmg process as a game becomes more pronunent. Second, the 
model requires comparatively much, detailed infonnation about吐E
subiect matter, and fortunately there exists such information as to 
meet the demands of the model By applymg the bureaucratic pohtics 
model to the North China Incident, the writer hopes to examine the 
validity of the model, 1.e., how deep and well it can cut the event, 
and also to find new insights and different interpretations which, 
otherwise, might be overlooked. In this r田pect，由epurpose of this 
paper is two-fold 
3. The model employed here in the present paper was set forth by Gr曲amT. 
Allison first in his“Conceptual Models四 dthe Cub胡 MISsileCrisis，” Y百e
American Politi印 l/icience Review (September, 1969). It was then enlarged国
his excellent book; Essence of Decision: £；λplaining the α1ban M!Ssile O合同
Litle, Brown and Comp四y,1971 The Organizational Process Model皿dthe 
Governmental Politics Model presented in his book were refined as the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model by Gr曲ぉnT. Allison回dMorton H. Halperin See 
Allison and Halperin，“Bureaucratic Politics A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications，” in T阻 ter,Raymond, and Richard H Ul加回 eds.,The。ryand 
Policy in Inteκnational Relations, Princeton University Pres, 1972, pp. 41-79 
Incidentally, the word “bureaucratic”connotes“bureaucracy”“Bureaucratic 
polticis，＇’however, by no me皿sis identical with “bureaucracy，＇’ although they 
are very sim日目 τ'herefore, “bureaucratic politics” should be replaced by 
“governmental pohtics”which A国sonoriginally caled it, or by something else 
like“org皿iza首叩alpolitics.”The writer wil write about曲15matter m another 
article 
4 Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile CriS1s, 
Litle, Brown and Company, 1971, p 6. 
、
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古田 periodof time that will be dealt with担 thispaper is about a 
mon由叩dhalf July 7, 1937 to August 15, 1937.* During the 
period, the games of mobihzation, peace moves, and abandoning the 
non毛xpansionpolicy were played by the players concerned who tried 
to get出eirdesired results.古田 eventthat initiated血efirst of these 
games was吐ie Marco Polo Bndge Incident, which, the writer will 
po恒tout, was an outcome of the orgamzat10nal routines. 
官官 centralpuzzle is why and how the North China Incident broke 
out at由attime and why it could not be settled. In order to answer 
血isquestion, governmental actions' relevant to the incident will be 
identified, and each player’s stands and stakes which aggregated to 
each specific action will be described. Incidentally，血epurpose of this 
paper is not to analyze the mteractions between Japan and China, but 
the actions of由eHopei-Chahar Political Council and the Chinese 
Nationalist Government will be referred to insofar as they help us 
understand吐ie actions of the Japanese Government concerning the 
North China Incident. 
I百1eMarc刀 PoloBndge Incident and Organizational Routines 
I. Some Signals 
In early May 1937, Major General-Kita Seiichi,** military attach己担
Peking, Lieutenant Colonel Wachi and Ohashi, general-staffs of the 
* In order to analyze what aggregated to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 
events before由attime wil be naturally referred to 
材 Throughout由ISpaper names are given m出eJap叩eseorder, i.e , with farmly 
names first. 
5. Hosoya, Chihiro，“Characteristics of世田ForeignPolicy Decisronmak担ESystem 
in Japan，” prep紅edfor the 1972 Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Dall田， Texas.See also ProιHosoya’s“Tai Sankyoku G創koo ik釘tl
Susumeruka”（How to Shape Tri-polar Foreign Policy), Chuo Koran, July, 1973, 
pp 101 7. 
6 Accepting Allison and Halperin’s definition, by governmental actions，、四me皿
“出ev叩ousacts of oficials of a government in exercises of governmental 
authori町出atc阻 beperceived outside血egovernment”See Allison叩d
Halperin, op. cit, p.45 
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Japanese North China Army were recalled to Tokyo and reported也叫the
anti-Japanese policy by Chiang Kai-shek would continue until the retrieval 
of Manchuria They recommended that，血 caseof曲ewar with the 
Soviets, Japan should p間四nt白eNationalist Government from jo皿ing
血em，叩d出at,if血atfailed, Japan should strike a白rstblow to crush the 
foundation of Chiang Kai-shek.7 
In June，也oughnot a sign of 1t was found m Peking, a rumor也atthe 
Japanese North China Army was planning another Mukuden Incident on 
由eevening of July 7, was prevalent with same田alityaround Miyake-
四ka*m Tokyo.8 Taking heed to this rumor, Major General Ishiwara, 
Chief of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff, had a talk 
about血ismatter with Major General Ushiroku, Chief of由eMilitary 
Affairs Bureau of世田WarMinistry，叩ddecided on dispatching Lieutenant 
Colonel Okamoto and Colonel Shibayama of the War Mmistry on an 
inspection tour to North China.9 On his return to Tokyo on June 9, 
Colonel Shibayama reported that in North China “. propaganda against 
the Jap叩eseArmy has become fervent. Top officials in the 29th Army 
understand Japan but there is an active anti-Japanese sent卸1ent町田ngthe
soldiers below the middle class, two世田dsof which are anti-Japanese 
advocates.”10 On June 18, Lieutenant Colonel Okamoto returned to 
Tokyo with a report that “the North China Army has no intention to plot 
回皿cident,while there may be provocative actions by the Chinese，加
view of the grave atomosphere between世田twocountnes.”11 
* This is where the War Ministry and the Army General Staff were located 
7. T；四aka,Shinich4“Shina-J1hen Kiroku”（The Document of the China War), 
Yomiuri Shinbun Sha ed., Showa-shi no Tenno (The Emperor in the HIStory of 
Showa), Vol XVI Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 1971, pp. 56-7 
8. Teradaira, Tadasuke, Rokokyo Jiken (The Lukouchiao Incident), Yommri 
Shinbun Sha, 1970, p. 47. See also “K剖•abeTorashiro Shosho K制soOto-roku” 
(Records of皿 Inte四iewwith M司orGeneral Kawabe To阻由iro),Gendai-sh1 
Shiryo (Modem HIStorical Materials), Vol. XII (The Chma War IV), Misuzu 
Shobo, 1965, p. 412. 
9. Ibid, p .47. See also “Kawabe Tor田hiroShosho Kaiso Oto-roku，” op. cit, p. 
412 
10. Boei cho Boei kenshu-sho Senshi・ shitsu, Hokush1 no Chian-sen (The Battle for 
M創ntain恒EPeace in North China), Vol I, Asagumo Shinbun Sha, 1968, p. II 
I. Ibid. 
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Colonel Nagatsu, Chief of the Chinese Section of the Army General 
Staff, on his return to Tokyo on June 8, had reported“the New Life 
Movement under the leadership of Cluang Kai-shek is changmg into the 
general mobilizat10n for the military state回 dthey are so self-confident as 
to fuel antt-Japanese sentiments.”12 
Around the s田netime. m June, there was also informat10n commg担to
Tokyo that the Chinese were m a hurry preparing operat10ns ag副nst
Japan Paying attention to this mformation, Maior General Ishiwara and 
Colonel Muto of the Army General Staff sent Captain Imoto of the 
Operations Section to North China for inspection. According to Captain 
Imoto’s memoir, he often felt imperiled by the Chinese officials’ 
interference with his inspection and he was nearly arrested by Chinese 
soldiers when he was at the Marco Polo Bridge with Major SakuraJ, 
Military Advisor of General Sung Cheh-yuan.日
From白esummer to autumn of 1936, Kaz出羽iAkira went to China for 
inspec世onbefo田 hetook office as Chief Secretary of the First Konoye 
Cabmet. Because of fervent anti-Japanese movement, he had to give up 
go加Eto Peking and Changsha. Even a Chinese known as a pro-Jap皿ese
whom Mr. Kaz四timet at 出nkowshouted也eycould not help figh也lg
with arms to the last one if Japan should meddle in North China 14 
Accordmg to Matsumoto Shigeharu of The Rengo Press, who was a 
close friend of Prime Minister Konoye, diplomatic negotiations between 
白etwo countries we田 totallyimpossible because of distrust, and the 
Chinese seemed to try to launch an all-out attack by taking advantage of 
any opportunity .15 
As we have seen so far, some signals were perceived by the Army 
General Staff and the War MintStry, and others seemed to have reached 
Premier Konoye血roughMr. Kazami叩 dhis friend Matsumoto. The日
we出 stilother signals perceived by世田 NorthChina Army and a military 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., p. 1・12.
14. K田ami,Akira, Konoye Naikaku (The Konoye Cabinets), Nippon Shuppan 
Kyodo Kabushiki Gaisha, 1951, p 1. 
15. Yabe Te司i,Konoye Ayamaro, Vol. I, Kobun Do, 1952, p 397. 
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attache of the Japanese Emba田yin Peking as will be described below 
On July 3, General Feng Chib－皿 of血eChinese 37也 Divisionmet 
Major Im田， mihtaryattache m Peking, and criticized出at“theJapnaese 
Army fired upon the street of the Marco Polo Bridge during the nigbt 
maneuver of June 29. Such an ilegal act10n should be refrained ” i• On 
也esame day，吐ieHopei-Chahar Political Council asked the North China 
Army to give them an advance not!田 ofthe m四 euverswi也 blank
cartridges.17 In reply to this request, the notice was dehvered that night to 
血eHopei・Chahar Political Council that the Japanese Army would engage 
担 nightand day maneuvers with blank cartridges at也eMarco Polo Bridge 
for four days tarting July 6.18 
On the evening of JuJy・6, General Shi You-san of the Chinese Army 
hurried to Major Imai, informing of the outbreak of hostilities between the 
Chinese and Japanese armies at由eMarco Polo Bridge. The Major asked 
him about血atinformation source, but he somehow declined to give皿
叩 swer.19 That nigbt pa田edpeacefully. But strangely enough，由e
following由民tsaw a clash at the Marco Polo Bridge just as General Shi 
You-san had told 
It is unknown whether or not these messages were transmitted to 
Tokyo. Even if血eydid not reach To勾o,at least Major General Ishiwara 
阻 dothe白血 theArmy General Staff and the W町 Ministrymust have 
sensed some白血Every grave about the situat10n m North China, through 
血ereports p四回ntedby Colonel Shibayarna阻 do出ersas described thus 
f町
2. No Smoke without Fire 
It田emsthat there were probably some causes behmd those signals 
16 Imai, Takeo, Shina-jihen no Kaiso (Reminiscences of the Ch担aIncid回り，Misuzu
Shobo, 1964, p. 6 At出attime, Maj田 Imaiwas instructed diJ:ectly by the Army 
General Staf, as曲eJap阻eseAmbassador stayed in Shan酔aisince the Chinese 
Nationalist Gove四men!moved to Nanking. 
17 Teradaira, op. αt., p. 49-50. See also the deposition of H田hlfiotoin 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, hereafter IMTFE, Vol. V, Yusho 
Do Shoten, p 13 7 
18. Ibid. 
19 Ibid., pp 52-3 
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stated above. Just before the formation of the Frrst Konoye Cabinet, the 
then Fo日1gnMinister Sato launched a diplomatic demarche to deal with 
China on吐tebasis of equality and reciprocity. This however did not ease 
回世－Japanesesentiment or dispel出strustresu胤ngfrom a series of 
Japanese sep町a世onpolicies of North China which had been adopted since 
世田 ManchunanIncident Specifically，世田 SuiyuanIncident plotted by 
Colonel Imamura and Major Tanaka of the Kw皿tungArmy in 1935, 
which ended up il failure, resulted il givmg military confidence to the 
C凶iese叩 d担 fuelinganti-Japanese sentiment.2° In addit10n, the North 
China Army was doubly reinforced in・May 1936 for吐iepurpose of (I) 
defense ag血nstCommurusm in North China and (2) protection of the 
Japanese residents there, both of which were officially stated by the Army 
authorities on May 15.21 But another most important purpose was never 
disclosed. As a matter of fact, th白reinforcementwas intended加prevent
the Kwantung Army jトommeddling in North China, which叩 snot of 
course notified to the Chinese Government or to the Hopei Chahar 
Polltzca/ Council. 2 As a result, it was taken as a Japanese illtention to 
move into North China by arms not only by吐ieChinese but also by the 
Japanese and foreign residen白血ere.23At first, the Army General Staff 
was to choose τungchow, Peking, or Tientsin as吐teplace for reillforce-
ment from the military point of View However, Vice War Minister Umezu, 
who was a doing man with mfluence, strongly objected ag副nstthem on 
the ground血at也eywere not suitable阻 termsof也eProtocol of也e
Boxer Troubles in 1901. Thus the political opinion defeated the military 
20 Hokushi no Chian・sen, Vol I, p 10 
21 Nippon Kokusai-seIJO Gakkai, Taiheiyo-senso e noMichi, Vol. II (The China 
War I), As曲iShinbun Sha, 1962, p. 183-4 
2.“Ishiwara E叩~I Chujyo Kruso Oto-roku”（Records of an Interview with 
Lieutenant General Ishiwara k胡•ii),Gen由i-shiShi，甲o,Vol IV (The China War 
1), MISuzu Shobo, 1964, p 304. See also Taiheiyo senso e no M1ch1, VoL II, p. 
184-5. 
23. Boei-cho Boei-kenshu-sho. Sensh1-shitsu, Daihonei Rikugun bu (Army Division 
of出eImperial Headquarters), Vol I, As暗umoShinbun Sha, 1969, p 375. 
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one, and at last Fengtai * was chosen as the locat10n 24 In other words, 
吐tisreinforcement was nothmg more than a resultant of the internal 
adjustment within the Japanese Army, z.e., to have the North Cluna Army 
check the Kwantung Army. Quite contrary to the Japanese intent10n to 
check the Kwantung Army, however, the reinforcement was taken by the 
Chinese as a clear signal that Japan would advance into North China by 
arms.τ111s Japanese move, it IS assumed, undoubtedly caused the Chinese 
to take a counter-measure 25 
Here it would be of some help to take a glimpse of the position of 
General Sung Cheh-yuan, the chairman of the Hopei Chahar Political 
Council, whose Army was to have the first自ghtwith the Japanese North 
China Army at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7. 
The Hopei-Chahar Poli!lcal Council, taking a pro-Japanese attitude, was 
very often criticized by both the North China Army and the Nationalist 
Govemment.26 A few months before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the 
North China Army tried to“compel General Sung Cheh-yuan to sign a 
contract for the construction by the Jap叩 ese of the Tientsm-
Shihchiachwang Railway，＇’27 while the Nat10nalist Government was 
making efforts to increase its influence in North China. Thus General Sung 
Cheh-yuan was qmte泊 afix. He was a sandwich pressed hard on both 
sides. So he retired in Western Shantung in May. It was taken that, pressed 
)'Y the Nationalist Government，“Sung (w刈 avoid加E出scu凶onwith 
Japane田 ofconstruct10n of the Shihkiachwang-Tientsin Railway，”havmg 
decided “not to cooperate econonlically with the J ap剖ieseunless East 
Hopei (was) returned ”28 In late June, rumo四 weresp日ad泊 Peking“of 
possible disorders being created by disgruntled Chinese or Jap叩ese
* Fengtai is not far from Lukouchiao where the Marco Polo Bndge Incident broke 
out, and also it is where an incident took place on September 18, 1936, between 
Japanese and Chinese百四ies
24“lshiwara Kanji Chujyo K創soOto-roku，＇・ op.cit., p. 304. 
25. Daihonei Rikugun-bu, Vol I p 375 
26. Matsui, Takuro，“Hate-naki Nitchu・ senso no Hakkaten”（The Outbreak of曲e
Endless Chma War), Bessatsu Chisei, Kawade Shobo, (December 1956) p. 202. 
27. United S担tesGovernment Prm出1gOffice, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1937, hereafter FRUS, Vol. II (The Far E田t),w田hington,1954, p. 94 
28. Ibid., p 111. 
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Nationals，＇’ which, according to the American Ambassador in Chma, 
seemed to be “primanly due to the uneasme田 which(had) developed 
among local Chmese as a result of Sung’s lengthening absence."29 On June 
21，出esoldiers of the 29th Army were given an instruction as follows: 
Informat10ns available seem to show the Japanese Army’s intention 
to take the Wanping garrison upon the pretext of maneuvers. As the 
situation has appeared to be very tense, the party in charge of patrol 
on the spot should be strictly vigilant 24 hours a day.30 
The Japanese maneuvers, coupled with the日mforcementof the North 
Chma Army, had undoubtedly caused them to take that measure. About 
these Japanese actmt1es, Chief of the DiVIsion of Far Eastern Affairs of 
the United States, states in his memorandum 
(The Japanese armed forces) seem to have a passion for engaging in 
“maneuvers.”They seem to derive special pleasure from “maneuver-
ing”during the hours between midnight and daybreak . Foreign 
observers, even those most sympathetic to the Japanese, have been 
unanimous m the opinion that these activities of the Japanese armed 
forces, whether or not so intended, have been mevitably provo-
cative.31 
3. Organizational Routines Unchanged 
Why did the above-stated signals fail to get the central players 
concerned and the North China Army to take any measure to cope with 
the ch阻gingsituation? To put it more specifically, were the signals clear 
and strong enough for the central players to take the situation in China so 
senously as to improvise皿ymeasure? The answer to血isquestion, 
considering from the evidence set forth m the first section, seems to be a 
negative one. Then, why is it so? 
As for the central players like lshiwara and others, the sginals, m the 
writer's judgement, probably influenced them to出eextent that they 
29. Ibid.,p 128 
30. Teradaira, op. cit., pp 137・8
31. FRUS, Vol II (The Far East), pp 167-8. 
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recalled the officials of the North Cl山aArmy to examine the situation 
and sent the officials of the War Ministry and the Army General Staff for 
inspection These signals, however, did not give an i血pactstrong enough 
to change their basic attitude or the basic military pohcy血at吐ie白rst
strategic enemy was Soviet Russia, which, they perceived, posed a threat 
to Japan by enormously increasing its armed forces in the Far East 32 The 
writer’s interpretation is也atthis foul-up resulted from their (I) placing 
priority on Soviet Russia, thus (2) handling the China i田uewithout much 
seriousness, and (3) underestimating the Chinese, influenced more or les 
by the sense of superiority of the Japanese. Therefore, if Soviet Ru田iahad 
sent those S1伊als,things nught have been quite different Such being the 
case, even由eArmy General Staff scarecely thought of possibility of a 
war with China, and therefore had no de伽iteplans of operations in case 
of the war with China except for those for protecting the Japanese 
nationals 3 
As already described, the North China Army did not have any plot 
ag：血nstChina. On the contrary, M司orGeneral Hashimoto Gun, Chief of 
Staff of the' North China Army, had been instructed by the Army General 
Staff and the War Ministry to the effect出atthey should not pose a 
poli世calor economic threat to the Chinese. 34 But in reality, the activities 
of the North China Army mentioned above did pose a threat to the 
Chinese.百ien,was it possible for the North China Army to change or 
modify the activities which the Chinese considered so provocative, given 
the above mentioned signals？百四NorthChina Army, to quote Lieutenant 
Teradaua of the Special Service Section of the garrison troops，“could not 
stop the military review just because of the rumo回．”35 The reason w出
血atJuly was the time for the completion of the company dril and the 
second review was to begin on July 9.36 According to Major General 
32. The deposition of Tanaka Shinichi担 JMTFE,Vol. V, p. 144 
3.“Ishiwara Kanji Chu1yo Kaiso Oto-roku，” op, cit., p. 313 See also“Kawa be 
Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku，”op. cit.,p 413 4 
34. The depositron of Hashimoto Gun m IMTFE, Vol V, p. 136. 
35. Teradaira, op cit., p. 441. 
36. Matsui, op, cit., p. 202. 
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Hashimoto, the night maneuvers were the most active from April through 
October every year 37 And these maneuvers were not agianst the Chinese 
army, but against the Russian army m the Far East which was equipped 
with heavy weapons. In order to avoid heavy damage which nught be 
incurred by these Russi阻 heavyweapons, nights or daybreaks had to be 
chosen for the maneuvers. 38 In addition, to quote Ma1or General 
Hashimoto，“these maneuvers had to be earned out; at l四st,a certain 
number of times based on a certain rule.”39 Such being the case, it was 
totally impossible for the organizational routines to be changed until血ey
turned out to be inappropriate for吐iechangmg sttuat10n or the event took 
place Now it is safe to say that the North China Army’s maneuvers凪
accordance with出eorg皿izat10nalroutines, coupled with the Chinese 
reaction to血em,produced the outcome, le., the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident. 
If the North China Army had not been reinforced in order to check the 
Kwantung Army, if the Japanese night m阻euvershad been called of, the 
Marco Polo Bndge Incident would not have broken out, at least, at that 
也市 ormight have been put of. To sum up, the Incident resulted mainly 
from the internal political outcome in the Japanese Army, orgamzat10nal 
routmes of the North China Army, underestimation by the Japanese 
central players of the Chinese sttuation in comparison with that of RusSla, 
distrust and miscommunication between Japan and China, and the Chinese 
reaction to the first two causes. 
Neediess to say，由efirst shot from either side directly caused the 
Marco Polo Bndge Incident. And from the available evidence, a third 
party, taking advantage of the grave situation, seems to have caused the 
Chinese 29th Army to fire the first shot, as也eywere very nervous about 
the Japanese凶ghtmaneuvers 40 Here we shall not deal with this matter 
37. The deposition of H田himotoGun in IMTFE, Vol V, p. 141. 
38 Teradaira, op. cit., p. 441. 
39. The deposition of Hashimoto Gun in IMTFE, Vol V, p. 141. 
40. Though there are various interpretations of the direct causes of the Indicent, it 
seems highly probable from the availablc evidence曲目athird p町tyhad both 
the Jap叩 ese 田dChinese armies fight See Ikeda Jyunkyu, Nippon no 
Magarikado (The Turning Point of Jap阻）， Chishiro Shuppan, 1968, pp 105-12 
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any further because we consider it more important and also more 
productlve to describe and explain how the Incident was not settled but 
exp阻 ded血roughthe games played by vanous players who tried to get 
吐ieirdemed results. 
I 百1ePolitics of Non吋expansion
1. Different Faces of the Incident 
As stated earlier, even the Army General Staff had no definite plans of 
operations in case of war with China So, needless to say, the Konoye 
Cabinet had no such plans, either. Th田efacts mean that there existed no 
concrete programs to cope with such a situation in any organization of the 
decision-makers.百四日fore,the issue，日時tof al, required the central 
decision-makers to improv!Se a measure to cope with the event. Now let us 
follow how the incident lnlllated the pohcy game of non expansion 
-July 8 -In the early morning, the first mformation of the outbreak 
・of由eincident was telegraphed to the Army General Staff by M吋or
General Hashimoto Gun, Chief of Staff of the North China Army.41 At 
about the same time, the Foreign Ministry received this informat10n, and 
也eofficials concerned with the problem were immediately called to the 
Office.42 War Minister Sugiyama mformed Chief Secretary Kazami of the 
incident, and Kazami immediately told Prime Minister about it.43 This 
was the way the players m each org回目ationgot the first informat10n of 
血eissue which started a decision game. 
When they got the first mformation, what were the players’react10ns 
upon the issue, i e.,their perceptions of the issue which worked on their 
stands in the game in which they would participate? 
“There happened an awkward th加g，＇’ ColonelSlubayama of the War 
Ministry telephoned on that day to Colonel Kawabe of the Army General 
Staff.44 On the contrary，“An interesting thing has happened！”was the first 
41 Hokushi no Chian・sen, Vol I, p. 18. 
42. Ishi, !taro, Gaiko kan no Jssho (The Life of a Diplomat), Taihei Shuppan Sha, 
1972, p 238. 
43. Kazarni, op. cit., p 28 
4.“Kawabe Tor田hiroShosho Kaiso Ot。roku，”opCit., p. 414 
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reaction of Colonel Muto, Chief of the Operations Section of the Army 
General Staff.45 At his iuncture, Colonel Muto had阻 mtent10nto settle 
the North China problem, if nece田ary,by force.46 Colonel Tanaka, Chief 
of the Army Affairs Section of the War Ministry, saw the issue in the same 
way as Colonel Muto did. The two chiefs had the same op1mon that・ 
. the situation does not warrant pptirnism. To cope with it，世田re
1s no way but to resort to force. It 1s, therefore, necessary to increase 
the troops m North Chma and to strike a first blow at a good 
opportunity. Thus we can settle the 1田ue... ~7 
Colonel Nagatsu, Chief of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, 
also advocated a military action against China.48 So did Colonel Kasahara, 
Chief of the Russian Section of the Army General Staff 49 However, the 
issue was qmte an embarassing thing to Major General Jshiwara who 
thought that Japan and China should never fight wi由eachother.50 
Then what was the reaction in the Foreign Ministry? Accordmg to Vice 
Mmister Horiuchi, the incident was never anticipated.51 Though successive 
telegrams from仕団 Embassyin Peking reported that the outbreak of the 
incident was due to the ilegal fire by the Chinese, Foreign Minister E五rota,
Vice Minister Horiuchi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishi, and Chief 
of the European-American Affairs Bureau Togo, first recalled the 
Mul《udenIncident by the Kwantung Army and then said, 
agam”52 Then they agreed to a policy。fnon-exp叩 si。nand local 
settlement. 
45 Ibid. 
46. Daihonei Rikugun bu; Vol I, pp 429-30. 
47. Ibid., p. 430 See also “Nishimura Toshio K創so-roku”（TheMemoir of 
Nishiruura Toshio), Gendaishi Sh1ryo, Vol. XII (The China War IV),. M1Suzu 
Shobo, 1965, p. 461. 
48.“Kawabe Tor田hiroShosho Kaiso Qt。roku，”op.cit., p. 414. 
49. Ibid. 
50.“Ishiwara k田~iChujyo k日 oOt肘 oku，”op.cit., pp 305-6 
51 The deposition of Honuch1 Kensuke in IMTFE, Vol. VI, Yusho Do, 1968, pp 
792-3 
52. !sh臼，op.cit., p. 238. 
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When Prime Minister Konoye heard the mformat10n from Kaz由ni,he 
S副d，“Surelyit wasn’t a plarmed activity by the Japanese Army, was 
it？”53 The Prime Minister血oughtthe Japanese North China Army had 
eventually engineered it. 54 According to Chief Secretary Kazami, the 
Minister皿 dthe Vice Minister of the Navy also had a suspicion也atthe 
Army might have caused the event日
τhese were也ereact10ns of several important players who would 
struggle with one another m the decision game. Strangely enough, no one 
doubted由atthe incident had been triggered by the Chinese. With these 
percep世onsof the players’in mind, let us follow how they began the 
game 
羽田 WarGuidance Section of the Army General Staff, whose chief was 
Colonel Kawabe, drafted a plan•ofa non-expansion policy to which the War 
Ministry agreed. 56 In the morning Mr. Ishi, Chief of the Asian Affairs 
Bureau of the Foreign M泊四try,Rear General Toyoda, Chief of the Naval 
Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry阻 dMajor General Ushiroku, Chief of 
the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry met at Mr. Ishi's office 
and agreed upon a non-exp皿sionpolicy In世田 afternoon,the Inner 
Cabinet decided upon a policy of non-exp阻 sionand local settlement of 
血eincident. And at 6:42 p.m., Chief of Staff, Prince Kan'in sent a 
telegraphic order to the Commanding Officer of the North China Army, 
which read，“In order to prevent the spread of the incident, further resort 
to nulitary force be refrained ”57 
Before sending to Tokyo the first telegram of the incident, the North 
China Army had convened the staff meeting and decided to settle the issue 
locally and not to ask the Kwantung Army and others for reinforce-
men ts. 58 Then the North China Army began negotiations with the Chinese 
53 Kazanu, op cit., p. 28. 
54. Ikeda, op CIC., p. 112. See also Konoye Fumimaro, Ushina1叩reshiSeiji (The 
Po~tics Lost), As曲tShinbun Sha, 1946, p. 10 
55 Kazarni, op. cit., pp 28-9. 
56. Honba, K抵uo,Shina-jihen Senso-shido shi （＇百1eHistory of Directing血eChina 
Incident), JiJi Tsushin Sha, p. 82. 
57. Ho知的ino Chwn-sen, Vol. I, p. 18. 
58.τ'he testimony of H田himotoGun in IMTFE, Vol V, p. 137 See also Hokush1 
no Chian・sen, Vol. I, p 18 
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29th Army. 
While Tokyo and the North China Army made efforts to setle the 
incident locally, the Kwantung Army independently made a statement at 
8: 10 p.m., announcing that: 
An event has now arisen in North China due to出echallenge of the 
outrageous 29th Army. Wi白muchconcern and great determination, 
也eKwantung Army wil closely observe the development of the 
incident日
This statement, it is conside日d,eVIdently constituted an action of the 
Japanese Government, which was not authorized by the central decision-
makers Since this action was obviously directed to the Chinese Govern-
ment, it is afe to assume也at1t mfluenced the Chi島田epublic and oficials 
m some way or another The action must have confirmed a general lilage 
也atJapan was determined to move mto North China, and also must have 
caused some officials to perceive that the Japanese, and particularly, the 
Kwantung Army had engineered the incident 
Then how did the Chinese decision-makers perceive and react upon the 
issue? It is of course very difficult and, at the s叩 etime, not the subiect 
matter of the present paper to examine their perceptions and react10ns m 
detail. Nevertheless, it would be of some help to know a litle about 
吐四minorder to understand the development of the incident. As described 
凪 thepreceding chapter, the chairman of the Hope1-Chahar Political 
Council was m a dilemma between the Japanese North China Army and 
the Nal!onalist Government, but never wanted a trouble with the 
Jap祖 ese.60 Even if he thought that也eincident .was caused by the 
Japanese, he must have hoped for a peaceful settlement of the issue m 
order to preserve his pos1l!on. 61 Then how about the Nationalist 
Government? The first reaction of the Nationalist Government appeared in 
叩 oralprotest made by the Chinese Foreign Office to吐ieJapanese 
59. Daihonei Rikugun bu, Vol. I, p. 42. 
60. Ikeda, op cit., p. 94. 
61 Nashimoto, Yuhei, Chugoku no naka no Nippon-jin (The Jap田esein China), 
Dosei Sha, 1969, p 170 
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Embassy泊 Nanking.It protested“against‘attack by Japanese troops 
upon Chinese troops’and requested immediate cessation of hostiht1es”62 
τ'his Chinese action seems to have been affected partly担ythe perception 
“that the incident was clearly premeditated by the Japanese，＇’ which the 
American Counselor of Embassy in China was informed of by an official 
of the Chinese Foreign Office.63 Chinese War Minister Ho Ying-chm seems 
to have already believed that “the Kwan tung army, and especially Itaga組，
Chief of Staf.，泊 precipitatingthe incidents beginning July 7, midnight, 
had acted without sanction of the Japanese Government.”64 
2. The Game of Mobilization 
Now we shal examine how the July 11th Statement, or the 
Mobilization Statement, was made by the Japanese Government which 
comprised various players who saw different faces of the incident. 
-July 9 -At 8:50 am an extraordinary Cabinet Conference was held. 
At the Conference, War Minister Sugiyama proposed that“about three 
home divisions be sent, 1udgmg from the strength of the 29th Army and its 
antJ-Japanese attitude ”65 The War Minister wanted to get a prior approval 
of sending troops before issuing an actual order of it. How did the other 
Ministers react to this proposal? Naval Minister Yonai obiected against the 
proposal because he feared that it might give rise to a total war“So he 
insisted出atthe incident be immediately settled locally.67 Foreign 
Minister Hirota and the others were al against也eproposal. 68 Prime 
Minister Konoye也oughtthat, smce dispatching troops to China would 
cause a grave influence internationally, he could not leave everything to 
the War Minister Therefore he was absolutely against the dispatch of 
troops.69 But there is no evidence也atthe Prime Minister expressed his 
62 FRUS, Vol II (The F田 E回t),p 129 
63. Ibid., p. 129, 137-8 
64. FRUS, Vol. II (The Far E田t),p 138 
65. Daihonei Rikugun-bu, Vol I, p. 433. 
66 Taiheiyo-senso e no Michi, Vol IV, p. 8. 
67 Ogata, Taketora, !chi Gunjin no Shogai (The Life of a Serviceman), Bungei 
Shunjyu Sha, 1955, p. 24. 
68 Daihonei Rikugun-bu, Vol. I, p. 433. 
69 Harada, Kumao, Saionji ko to Seikyoku (Prince Saionji and出ePolitical 
Situation), Vol. VI, Iwanami Shoten, p 29 
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own view dunng the Conference. 
The extraordinary Cabinet meeting was followed by a Five Miruster 
Talk which agreed upon the following points. 
I. The mcident was caused by an ilegal Chinese action. 
2. We firmly maintain a non-expansion policy We hope that Chinese 
reflection should bring an early settlement of出eisue. 
3. If they would not reflect and mstead endanger the matter，、時
shal swiftly adopt a proper measure. 
4. Every Minister should be ready to attend an extraordinary 
Council at any time. 
5. The Imperial Government considers as a policy for settlement, 
withdrawal of the Chinese Army, punishment of the Chinese 
responsible for the matter, Chinese apology, and future guaran-
tee 70 
Inc1dentally, the pohcy of non-expansion and an early settlement of the 
incident had been requested by the Foreign Minister 71 
In the deliberat10n on settling the incident which was held between the 
Army General Staff and the War Ministry, Colonel Tanaka of the War 
Ministry exp田ssedan extreme opimon, 1.e., setting up a buffer zone 
contiguous to Manchoukuo This view was shared with Colonel Muto of 
the Army General Staff 72 Colonel Kawabe of the Army General Staff, 
however, had a different opinion from them. He thought it nece田aryto 
forward very simple terms to settle the issue. Then he got allied with 
Colonel Shibayama of the War Ministry. Colonel Shibayama persuaded 
other members in the War Ministry and reached a conclusion that the 
Minister and Vice Minister of War had no objection to the terms, and that 
it would be proper to send a telegram to the North China Army in the 
name of the Vice Chief of Staff. 73 Then in the evening the telegram was 
sent by the Vice Chief of Staff which read: 
70 Daihonei Rikugun bu, Vol !, p. 433 
71 The deposition of Horiuchi Kensuke in IMTFE, Vol VI, p. 793 
72 Daihonei Rikuβm bu, Vol. I, p. 434 
73.“Kawabe Torashiro Shosyo Kaiso Oto-roku，”op. cit., p 417 
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1.吐iewithdrawal of Chinese troops from the vicinity of the Marco 
Polo Bridge; 
2 guarantee for the future; 
3. punishment of those responsible for the mcident; 
4. apology.判
τbus advocates for moderate actions won, though tentatively. It was 
partly because血oywere buttressed by Major General Ishiwara and the 
atomosphere of the Inner Cabinet in favor of the non-exp回 sionpolicy. 
Meanwhile negotiations had been continued from dawn between the 
North China Army and the 29th Army. And the second in command of 
也e29th Army, General Chin Teh・ chun, told Colonel Matsui, Chief of the 
Special Service Section of the g町risontroops, that the Chinese Army担
吐levicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge would be m也drawn75 But at the 
same !!me, the Commander of the 29th Army, General Sung Cheh-yuan, 
received repeated telegrams from Chiang Kai-shek血atordered him to 
“proceed to Paoting and to d!rect operat10ns from there ”76 As a matter 
of fact, Chiang Kai-shek told “a large gathering of officials at Kuling that 
he was despatching six div!Slons of troops to North China.”7 According 
ta an information caught by the American Embassy凪 China,Chiang 
Kai-shek stated血at
difficult P。s1tion.He was pressed hard both by the advocates for war血
血egovernment and particularly by the Chinese Communist Party. He had 
been made to promise to hold the conference at the time of血eS1阻
Incident, and was repeatedly pressed not to settle the incident locally by 
the Chinese Communist Party. 79 Under such circumstances the 
S白白mentof the Kwantung Army disclosed on the prev10us day was just 
what the advocates for war wanted, and probably encou阻gedthem to 
compel Chiang Ka1-shek to take that stand. 
74 Daihonei Rikugun・bu,Vol. I, p. 434. 
15. 1五okushino Chian・sen, Vol I, p. 18. 
76: Crowley, James B., Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, Princeton University Pres, 
1966, fn 53 in p. 329. 
17. FRUS, Vol Il (The Far E田t),p. 138. 
78. Ibid. 
19. Taiheiyo・senso e no Michi,Vol II, p. 329, 331 & 340-2 
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With吐ienegotiation gomg on between both arrmes on the spot, it 
would be too hasty to conclude that Chiang Kai-shek was determined to 
go to war with Japan But we should not overlook the above-stated 
Chinese act10n which would have considerable effects on the Japanese 
Govenment as we shall see below. 
-July 10 The Army General Staff received an information from a 
nuhtary attache in China that the Nat10nalist Army had begun to move 
north. 80 This information was judged by the Operations and the War 
Guidance Sections of血eArll)y General Staff也atboth the Pinchin 
authorities and the Nanking Government were prepanng for war, which 
would endanger the Japanese North China Army田 wellas Japanese 
nationals也ere.So they thought it necessary to send immediately req凶red
troops to North China, which, in their judgement, would have litle 
probability for the Soviets to JO!n the war 81 Thus the Operations Section 
considered it nece田町yto send three home divisions and air corps as well 
as some dms10ns from the Kwantung Army and the Korean Army. This 
was based upon Colonel Muto’s idea that he had held since the outbreak of 
the hostilities. 82 Al也oughthe War Guidance Section of the Army General 
Staff was against this step, it was supported by Colonel Tanaka of the War 
Ministry. The positive stands of Colonels Muto阻 dTanaka, it seems, 
resulted partly from their preferences，田 andpartly from their positions 
which陀 quiredthem臼“beofficially re司：ponsiblefor implementing any 
mobilzzatzon plan of the government.”制 Surprisinglyenough, Lieutenant 
Colonels Takahaslu and Watan of the Chinese Section of the Army 
General Staff, whose JOb was to gather and叩 alyzenuhtary information 
about China and to plan military operations against China, had阻
optimistic view出atChina would easily give in only by mobilization of 
home divisions or at least a fight at Paotmg・85
80. Daihonei R1，λ：ugun-bu, Vol. I, p. 435 
81. Ibid, pp 434-5. 
82 Ibid., p 435 
83. As a general staf of由eKwantung Army, Colonel Muto engaged in active 
m阻 euversin North Chma, which ended up in f創Ju自由theSuiyuan Incident. 
From that time, to set up a buffer zone the回 washis objective. 
84. Crowley, op, cit, p 330 
85. Horiba, op cit, p. 85. 
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Colonel Honba Kazuo of the War Guidance Section of the Army 
General Staff, however, had quite a different plan. He insisted that no 
reinforcements be made, but firmly held that, 1f the development of the 
mcident should require reinforcements, 15 div1s10ns and 5 5 billion yen of 
the war expenditure would be necessary in order to settle the i田uewithin 
S日 months.86 This plan, however, was not seriously discussed by the 
members concerned because 15 divisions were half of the whole Army and 
the expenditure of 5.5 billion yen was considered nonsense 87 Especially 
to Fin祖国 MinisterKaya, an expenditure of 5.5 btllion yen was utterly 
absurd 88 Contrary to Colonel Horiba’s idea, Colonel Muto of the 
Operations Section thought a few divisions would be enough. And Colonel 
Tanaka of the War Ministry, explaining his plan, said to Colonel Horiba, 
“Aren’t you taking Japanese Army for Chmese one？”89 
M司orGeneral lshiwara, Chief of the Operations Division of the Army 
General Staff, highly app田ciatedHonba’s competence, and was, of course, 
m favor of Honba’s plan Consequently, he was naturally su中risedto find 
血atthe War Ministry advocating the forceful actions thought the 
expenditure of only three hundred million yen enough to defeat Chiang 
Kai-shek.四 MajorGeneral Ishiwara was personally an advocate for the 
non毛xpans10npolicy, and was against the mobilization proposal as the 
chief of the Operations Division. The dispatch of troops, he feared, would 
get Japan bogged down into a total war with China. Conversely, to leave 
the matter as it was might endanger the Japanese nationais and the North 
China Army. And moreover, mobilization would take several weeks He 
was pre田edhard not only by his painful position but by Ins subordinates, 
especially by Colonel Muto who insisted that the dispatch of troops be 
即時国aryto protect the Japanese nationals. Finally he gave in to the 
Colonel and consented to his request on condition that the troops never be 
86 Ibid .• p. 83・4.
87. Ibid., p. 84-5 
88 Yatsugi, K田uo,Showa Doran Shishi (The Personal Histroy of Upheavals in 
Showa), Vol I, Kabush1ki Galsha Keizai Orai Sha, 1971, p. 388. 
89. Horiba, op. cit, p. 86. 
90.“Ishiwara Kanji Ch吋yoKaiso Oto roku，”op.αt., p. 311. 
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used for war.91 Then at 6:00 p.m he “officially advised仕ieWar Minister 
of也eneed to mobilize five divisions in Japan.”四百四sthe development 
of the decISion game encouraged the advocates for mobilization and 
turned the balance m favor of them 
In the evening War Minister Sugiyama phoned Chief Secretary Kazarni 
and requested that an emergency meeting of the Inner Cabmet be held on 
the next day m order to decide upon阻 immediatedispatch of some 
troops 93 Kazarni at once informed Premier Knoye of the War Minister's 
request The Premier told Kazarni that he had no choice but to defer to 
世田 proposal Then Kazarni suggested to Premier Konoye that the 
representatives of出epolitical circles be immediately called and be asked 
for cooperation, to which the Premier agreed 94 This proposal was derived 
from consideration for the internal poh世田.In fonmng his Cabinet, Pnme 
Minister Konoye had picked only two Ministers from the political parties, 
and he did it arbitrarily. Such being the case, the Cabinet did not 
get on well with the political circles. So he feared出atthe military would 
take advantage of，回dincite them to be in favor of the positive measures. 
The Premier, therefore, thought it necessary to get血eirsupport as his 
bargaining advantage, or at least not to get them to take sides with the 
military in order to solve the 出ue.95 百latis why he agreed to the 
Secretary’s proposal.τ'he Pnme Mimster, however, seems to have failed to 
calculate the possible effects of the decision, which, contrary to his 
expectat10n, might fuel the war sentiments. 
In Nanking, on the other hand, Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese 
Embassy in Shanghai, met before noon W四 EChung Hui, Chinese F ore1gn 
Minister, who had come back from Kuling after having met Chiang 
Kai-shek there.百四Counselorand the Foreign Mimster“expressed to each 
other the hope血atthe incident would be brought speedily to an amicable 
91. Nashimoto, op. c1t.,p 179. 
92 Crowley, op. cit., p. 330. 
93. K田ami,op. cit., p. 30 
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid., p. 30 4. 
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settlement.”96 According to the Domei's report from Hankow, Chiang 
Kai-shek ordered four divisions of his army to prepare for an attack on the 
following day 97τhis information, coupled with the above-stated instruc-
lion of Chiang Kai-shek, cont四dictedthe Foreign Minister’s talk.τhese 
incompatible facts seem to have implied that there existed different views 
m吐ie Natronalist Government, and that the advocates for positive 
measures were gain泊gpower though Chiang Kar-shek did not yet decide to 
fight. 
The same held true of也eHopei-Chahar Political Council with which 
the Japanese North China Army was directly negotiating.百四 Hopei-
Chahar Political Council would not consent to the withdrawal of the 
Chinese Army while they agreed to the rest of the terms for negotiation. 98 
That was because世田yfeared也atthe Japanese Army would advance to 
the Marco Polo Bridge after their withdrawal.四百四 attitude,it seems, 
was affected partly by也ehawks泊 the29血 Army.At 2:00 p.m. the 
Japanese Navy intercepted a signal sent to也eU.S. Navy by a U.S. Naval 
attache in Peking to世田 effectthat young of:白cersunder the command of 
General Sung Cheh-yuan, di田atisfiedwith the local agreement, decided 
upon launching an attack ag剖nstthe Japanese Army starting 7:00 pm. 
血atday 1凹 Thisrnformation implres that General Sung Cheh-yuan did 
not have an effective control of his army, and that he was placed in a very 
difficult and unstable position. 
July 11 -At some time past eight in the morning, Major General 
lshiwa四 calledon Premier Konoye and asked him to“r句ectthe 
mobtlization proposal to be submitted by the War Ministry at the Inner 
Cabinet目”101 羽山 factimplies that the Major General had failed to get his 
idea supported by the War Ministry, and也atin order to get his desired 
result he had to put出e回目 onan informal charrneL Also担 theearly 
96. FRUS, Vol II (The Far E田t),p. 135-6. 
97. Daihonei R1kugun-bu, Vol. I, p 436. 
98. Hokushi no Chian-sen,Vol I, p 18. 
9. Imai, op. cit., p 29 
100 Teradaira, op. cit., pp 231-2 
101 Hirota Koki D印刷 K四koKai ed , Hirota Kok1, Chuo Koren Jigyo Shupp叩，
1966, p. 258-9. 
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mom担g，叩 agentfrom世田 MilitaryAffairs Bureau of世田 WarMinistry 
came to the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry to ask也at出e
Foreign Minister should z句ectthe mobilization proposal of sending ti古田
div1S1ons which w出 tobe submitted by the War Miruster. 102τhis fact 
shows也atthe mmority in吐ieWar Ministry, who were against the 
mobilization, had to resort to another channel.τhis action, the writer as-
sumes, was probably taken by Colonel Shibay町田 ofthe War M血istry-1°3
At 9:00 a.m. Mr. Ishi of the Foreign Ministry went to Tok}'o Station 
to see Foreign Minister Hirota and asked him to r句ectthe mobilization 
proposal, to which the Minister nodded.1倒 Andthen, at the Foreign 
・Office, Forei伊 MinisterHirota had a talk with his men, Vice Minister 
Horiuchi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishi, and Chief of European 
and American Affi回目 BureauTogo, and decided也atthe Foreign Ministry 
should reject the mobilization proposal.105 By皿 orderof Hirota, the 
Vice Minister invited Charge d'affairs of血 ChineseEmbassy in Japan, 
Yang Yun-chu, to也eForeign Office叩 dstated that an immediate local 
settlement was necessary, and that a telegraphic instruct10n had been sent 
to the Jap叩 eseAmbassador to China.＇師
At 11 :30 a.m. a Five Minister Talk began. War Minister Sugiyama 
submitted a proposal that some divisions from the Kwantung and the 
Korean Armies be sent immediately to support the North China Army, 
叩 dthat at the same time at least five home divisions be dispatched at 
once.10' Naval Minister Yonai, usually very reticent and cautious m 
speaking partly due to a tacit agreement between Army and Navy not to 
interfere with each other, strongly supported the opinion of the 
Operations Section of the Naval General Staff皿dobjected against the 
102. Ishi, op.α＇t., p. 239. 
103. Se fn. 44. 
104. Ibid. 
105. The deposition ofHonuchi Kensuke in IMTFE, Vol. VI, p. 793. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Ogata, op. cit., p 25 
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proposal.＇田 TheNaval Minister feared that the dispatch of也etroops 
rrught lead to a total war with China 109 In spite of Adrrural Yonai's 
obiection, War Minister Sugiyama went on to assert that he could not 
tolerate annihilat10n of 5,500 men of the North China Army and Japanese 
nationals in Tientsin area. "0 He also disclosed his belief that the dispatch 
of troops would bring about an early, local settlement of血eincident '" 
Insofar as the dispatch was restricted to North China, the Naval Minister 
had no reason to oppose it虹1yfurther 112τ'lms he reluctantly consented 
to the War Minister’s proposal. The Naval Minister, however, did not forget 
to take the initiative to get an agreement也at“thisinc1den t should never 
be町田出erMukuden Incident.”113 F ore1gn Minister Hirota kept silent 
町idPrime Minister Konoye did not expre田 anythingagainst the 
proposal.114 The Prime M凶sterfeared血athis objection aga泊stthe 
proposal would lead to the War Minister's resignation and出ento the 
Cabinet collapse, and that，加 thatcase, no one could restra泊 the
military m There is no evidence that Finance Minister Kaya, who was 
present there on account of the budget to be required by the dispatch of 
troops, objected against the War Minister’s proposal. 
At 2:00 p.m. the Five Minister Talk was followed by an emergency 
Cabinet meeting, where世田 mobilizationproposal was approved without 
much argument on condition that the dispatch of troops be cancelled if 1t 
became unnecessary .U6 古田governmentalso decided to cal the incident 
“The North China Incident. ”At 6:25 p.m. just after the Cabinet 盟国ion,
108. Kazami, op. cit., p. 34. Hata, op. cit., p. 201, 203. According to K田ami,
Pr即時Minister Konoye (if not, Vice Naval Minister Yamamoto) probably asked 
Naval Minister Yonal to take由ataction because the Pnme Minister used to get 
others who shared his view to speak on behalfofhimself. See Kazami, op cit., 
p. 35. 
109. Ogata, op. cit., p. 24. 
110. Ibid. 
111. Hata, op. cit., p. 201 
112 Ibid, P・ 202 
113. Kazami, op. cit., p. 34 
114 Hata, op.αt., p. 201. 
115. Harada, op cit, p. 30. 
116 Taiheiyo-senso e no Mich1, Vol. IV, p. 10 
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the Prime Minister held a press confe四neeand made an oficial statement 
of吐iegovemment, which was proposed both to get a nation-wide support 
and to force the Chinese to consent to the settlement Pnme Minister 
Konoye announced as follows: 
. Inspite of也estrained situation m Pingchin area threatening our 
nationals, we did not give up our hopes of a peaceful settlement and 
endeavoured at a local settlement based on the non-expans10n 
poll'Y. Dmegardmg由econsent出atthey once gave to the peaceful 
settlement, the 29th Army abruptly made an ilegal attack on us and 
caused considerable casualties on the night of July JO. They 
repeatedly reinforced the front, and moreover pushed forward 
armed preparat10ns by advancing the divisions of Hsi Yuan south-
ward and by ordering the Central Army to move, and so forth τ'hey 
lacked sincerity to respond to peaceful negotiations and went so far 
as to totally decline the negotiations in Peiping. 
In view of these facts, there is no room for doubt that the recent 
incident is en甘relythe result of anti-Japanese military action on the 
part of China . 
τ'hus血ego四 mment,in Cabmet session today, decided upon 
necessary act10ns to be taken regarding the dispatch of troops to 
North China . 117 
Pnme Mi血sterKonoye believed that Cluna would give in if Japan should 
show positive attitude by declaring the dispatch oftroops.118 In any case, 
the statement obviously cons!Jtuted a formal action of the Japanese 
Government, which undoubtedly affected not only the Chinese decision-
makers and public but also their Japanese counterparts. How 1t affected 
bo由 sides,and the stands of出eplayers which resulted出血isaction will 
be explamed later. 
Just after the Cabmet session, the War Ministry received a telegram 
from the North China Army that there was high probability for an 
117. Daihonei Rikugun-bu, Vol. I, p. 439. 
118. Nashimoto, op cit., p 175. 
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agreement to be reached.119 Hearing the decision to send troops, M司or
General Hashimoto, Chief of Staff of the North China Army felt血atthere 
existed profound discrepancy between the North China Army and Tokyo, 
and he got血attelegram sent.120 Receiving the telegram, M句orGeneral 
Ishiwara cancelled the mobilization plan, and instead, authorized the 
dispatch from the Kwantung Army and the Ko時間Army.121 Hopes for 
local settlement were spread担 Miyakezaka.12 At 8：日Dpm bo由
Japanese and Chinese representa!!ves on the spot arrived at阻 agreement,
which was immediately reported to the Army General Staff.123' At about 
10:00 p.m. the five Ministers had a talk again. Then the Naval Minister 
inquired the War Minister about the mobilization. The War Minister replied 
that it would be possible to totally cancel the mobilization if the Chinese 
consented，担wnting,to the Japanese demands.124 
Around midnight, the War Ministry broadcasted a talk, which s田d:
. a cease-fire agreement was concluded today m Peking. Yet, m 
view of世田 attitudetaken血usfar by ihe Hopei-Chahar Political 
Council, we doubt very much whether or not 1t was based upon their 
sincenty, and we can not put ful confidence in it We must 
anticipate that吐tisagreement will be a mere scrap of paper m no 
125 !!me. 
百tisbroadcast was made by Lieutenant Colonel Amarniya of the Press 
Section of the War Ministry without authorization by his chief, Colonel 
Ha ta.出 Thoughunauthorized by the田morplayers, 1t was another 
119 Taiheiy。sensoe no Mi chi, VoL IV, p. 10 
120“Hashimoto Gun Chuiyo Kaiso Oto ・roku”（Records of an Interview with 
Lieu ten四tGeneral H田himotoGun), Gendai・shiShiryo, Vol IX (The China 
W旺 I),Ml5uzu Shobo, 1966, p. 323. Although由eprogress of the negotiation 
was cabled to Tokyo, Major General H田imotodid not know at that time how 
!lungs at h町田we田 developing.Ibid, and se also IMTFE, Vol V, p 141. 
121. Daihonei R1kugun-bu, Vol I, p. 439. 
122. Ibid 
123. Matsui, op cit., p. 204. 
124. Hata, op. cit., p. 202 
125. Matsm, op. cit., p. 204. See also Te四daira,op. cit., pp. 224 5. 
126. Terad血a,op. cit., p. 224. See also Mat叫， op.cit.; p 204. 
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serious action of世田 JapaneseGovernment, which also undoubtedly 
affected廿ieother side to a conS!derable extent.τbis broadcast, in fact, 
encou阻gedthe hawks担 theHopei-Chaliar Political Council.古田y
protested that: 
It is Japan that lacks smcerity, and has already made an excuse of 
breaking也eagreement The non-expansion policy田 wellas the 
cease-fire agreement is nothing more than a measure to g凶ntime to 
complete preparations for W町.127
Me皿while泊 Nanking,Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Chieh 
called on Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy there at 4 
o’clock. Pointing out吐iefacts “regarding the remforcement of Japanese 
troops担 thePeiping-Tientsin area，” Mr. Chen Chieh demanded血atMr. 
Hidaka“immediately cable the Japanese Government to order a cessation 
of Japanese military activities担NorthChina.”128 Mr. Hidaka replied that 
“the reported movement of Central Government troops northward (had) 
副venrise to apprehension on the part of the Japanese troops，”129百lOUgh
Mr. Chen Chieh assured Mr. Hidaka血atChinese troops had “no intention 
of provo脳nga war wi出 theJapanese Army，＇’130 he warned: 
China does not tolerate any alien country arbitrarily increasmg its 
garnson泊 Chinaand mfringing on her terntorial sovereignty If such 
action con白山es,. . . China will be forced to take defensive 
131 measures. 
3. Stakes and Stands of the Players Concerned 
We have followed恒也eprevious section how the July 11th Statement 
was made. We have briefly referred, here and there, to the stakes and 
st叩 dsof the players concerned, which resulted in the action of the 
127. Matsui, op. cit., p 204. 
128. FRUS, Vol Il (The Far East), p. 145. See also Gaimu sho Hyakunen-shi 
Hens叩 link創， Gairnu-shono Hyakunen (A Hund田dYears of血eFore1gn 
Ministry), Vol !I, Hara Shobo, 1969, p. 278. 
129. Ibid. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Ibid. 
164 
government, i ι，吐ieStatement of Mobilization Now we shal go泊to
details about them. 
Unlike the Army, the Navy w田 wellunder the control of Naval 
Minister Yonai and Vice Naval Minister Yamamoto, and the Naval Mmistry 
阻 d吐ieNaval General Staff were comparal!vely well coordinated. Tlus 
was, in the wnter's 1udgement, partly due to their leadership, and partly 
due to the non-involvement of the Navy’s interests in the incident. Insofar 
as the organizallonal interests were not involved, the Naval Mmister could 
object against the mobilizat10n proposal by the War Minister. Therefore he 
must have felt it unnece田aryto go so far as to have a日酔twith the War 
Minister, and eventually consented to the War Minister’s proposal, though 
reluctantly The Naval Mmister actually represented the Navy’s mterests as 
well as his personal皿terestsThe following evidence, it seems, supports 
甘iewriter’s interpretation. On July 11 the Naval General Staff obtained 
the Army General Staffs approval of its proposal出at,in case of need, the 
dispatch of troops be made to Shanghai as well as Tsingtao m order to 
protect the Japanese nationals there.132 
Although War Minister Sugiyama repeatedly presented the mobilization 
proposal, he was not四 advocatefor war with China. In fact, he felt that 
the incident was an awkward matter, ~s told to the New Commanding 
Officer of the North China Army, Mai or General Kazuki, who called on 
the War Ministry at 7:30 a.m on July 11 13 Then General Sugiyama gave 
no specific instruction other than to localize the incident based on the 
non-exp叩 sionpohcy 134 Just after that when M句orGeneral Kazukl 
received more specific instructions by the Chief and the Vice Chief of 
Staff, and出eChiefs of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions of the Army 
General Staff, the M司orGeneral felt that there existed quite different 
Views between the War Mmistry and the Army General Staff 135 War 
132 Dai, onei Rikugun-bu, Vol I, p. 438-9. 
133. "K田ukiKiyosh1 Chuiyo Kaiso叩 ku”（TheMemou of Lieutenant General 
Kazuki Kiyoshi), Gendoi・shi Shiryo, Vol. XII (The China War IV), Misuzu 
Shobo, 1965,p 531 
134. Ibid. 
135. Ibid. As for specific instruct10ns, se Daihonei Rikugun-bu, Vol I, pp 437-8. 
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Minister Sugiyama, m fact, had such an optmnstic view as to report later 
to the Emperor出atthe incident would be settled in about two 
months 136 He seemed to have an idea血atonly the statement of 
mobilizat10n would suffice to settle the matter.137 Since the War Minister 
had no accurate knowledge about the issue, 1t is not difficult to assume 
血athe was easily infiuenced by his men like Colonel Tanaka, who shared 
the extreme view with Colonel Muto of世田 ArmyGeneral Staff. Colonel 
Tanaka, Chief of the Army Affam Section, had a considerable infiuence 
smce the Section took charge of forming a budget 138 Furthermore, the 
War Minister must have felt it reasonable and justifiable to stick to出e
mobilization proposal since 1t was his JOb to protect both the Japanese 
North China Army and the Japanese nationals in Tientsin. 
We shall exanune Major General Ishiwara’s stakes and stand, which 
田emto have had a considerable effect on the game resulting in the July 
11血 Statement.I五so句ectivewas to complete, first of al, the war 
preparations against Ru回iaby enormously increasing the production of 
heavy industnes To this end, the Ma1or General considered 1t absolutely 
essential to mamtam peace for at least 10 years Therefore, to have a fight 
制thChina should be by al me阻srefrained.139 About a month before 
世田 MarcoPolo Bridge Incident, he had said definitely in the Foreign 
Ministry，“Not a single soldier shall be sent加 Chinaas long as I am 
136. Su匝yamaGensui Denki Kanko Kai ed, Sug•yarna Genrni Den (A Lire of 
General Sugiyama), Harn Shobo, 1969, p 66 
137. Ogata, op. cit.,p. 24. 
138“lshiw町aKanji Ch可yoK創soOto-roku.＇’op.αt.,p 316. 
139. Showa-sh• no Tenno, Vol. XVI, p 28“τ'he five-Year Production Exp朗 sion
Plan”approved by the Inner Cabinet on June 15, 1937 was based on Ishiwara’s 
idea. Ibid, p 29 See also Bessatsu Chisei (December 1956), P. 135. 
Bureaucrats of the Fmance Ministry, such田 Kaya,Hoshino, Ishiwata，阻d
Aoki, disagreed to the Plan which demanded 8.536 b副ionyen E甲ecialy,
Finance Minister Kaya and Commerce and Industry MinISter Yoshino tried to 
restrict it by “The Three Principles of Fin皿白血dEconomy，＇’which implied 
曲目白ebudget W田 no出血Emore白血 ascrap of paper unless there was 
corresponding supply of matetials See Nashimoto, op. e<t., p 179, and 
Showa-shz no Tenno, Vol. XVI, pp. 19-20. 
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alive.川崎 Wehave already po卸tedout that he was placed m a dilemma 
But why did he have to comply with Colonel Muto’s demand for 
mob~izat10n which was entirely contradictory to his objective? It is 
generally mamtained白atthe mformation of a military attache in Nanking 
compelled Maior General Ish1wara to agree to the mobil1zat1on propos-
al 141τbe writer wil not try to contradict tlus interpretat10n but would 
like to point out the following problem that we should not overlook. Why 
did that information work on him so heavily as to cause h担1to misjudge 
the situation and to give in to Colonel Muto when no request for 
reinforcements was made by the North China Army? To answer this, 
M司orGeneral Ishiwara’s position in the Army should be taken into 
consideration. First，叩dmost importantly, it w田 closelyconnected with 
the organizat10nal reform of the General Staff which世田 thenColonel 
Ishiwara carried out in June 1936 in order to atta凪 hisobjective stated 
above. He reinforced the Operations Division by establishing the War 
Guidance Section, and reprived the Intelligence and General Affairs 
Dmsions of ilieir ]Obs. As a result, ilie reform inevitably brought about 
enemies担 theseDivisions.142 Secondly, he had not served either in the 
Army General Staff or皿 ilieWar Ministry before he was appomted Chief 
of ilie Operations Section of ilie General Staff in August 1935.143 So he 
was simply an outsider. Lastly, he was the very man who had established a 
v1c10us precedent by the Manchurian Incident, Le.，“rule of the higher by 
由elower，” which gave others a good reason to challenge hrm openly. 1輔
In such a situation, he had to assume actual responsibtlity to manage the 
General Staff because Vice Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Imai, was 
seriously出.As already pointed out, however, his influence was in practice 
140. Ishu, op cit., p. 240. 
141. Hata, op. cit., pp目198,239. 
142. Ashizawa, Noriyuki, Aru-Sakusen・Sanbo no H1geki （τ"he Tragedy of a General 
Stafη，Fuyo Shobo, 1974, p. 135. 
143. Showa・shi no 71包nno,Vol. XVI, pp 32-3 
14. When Major General Ishiw田aof the Army General Staf once tried to check 
the Kw皿tungArmy’s active maneuvers in Mongolia, Colonel Muto of the 
Kw阻むungArmy would not obey him by saying calmly，“We are domg what 
you once did.”See Ikeda, op cit., p. 78. 
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restricted though he was an eminent strategist wi由 strongleadership and 
competence For example, he could not successfully persuade others or get 
their support at the Division meetings of the General Staff.145 According 
to也e血enchief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, 
Colonel Shibayama, many jumor officers both m the War Ministry and m 
the General Staff, such as Colonels Muto, Tanaka, and Kagesa, lieutenant 
Colonel Watari, M句orsYoshino and Kawamoto, who were ac加allym 
cha1宮eof drafting operational plans and gathering information, were al 
against the non expansion pohcy of Maior General lshiwara.146 Ironically 
enough, among his men was the strongest opponent, Chief of the Opera-
lions Section, Colonel Muto who had a definitely opposite objective間
from Maior General lshlwara’s.百1eM司orGeneral had only a few alies, 
tι，the War Guidance Section, his brain child, and the Military Aff:回目
Section. Only in such an unfavorable situation, he got overwheinled by 
出atmformation, which turned out to be a httle exaggerated, and 
reluctantly had to give in to Colonel Muto Yet, he was stil undecided. 
And then, knowing his unfavorable position in the Army, Maior General 
Ishiwara tned to start another game by putting the issue on an unofficial 
channel. Thus he began to get in contact with P口meMinister Konoye, as 
already briefly referred to. 
Now what were Prinle Minister Konoye’s stakes and stand? Although 
血ePrune Minister担 generalwas critically restricted in his influence 
凶 tit凶 onally,148 Prermer Konoye had some advantages m which no one 
145. Sho1叩－shino Tenno, VoL XVI, p. 37-8 
146. Ibid., p. 55 
147. Colonel Muto’s 0吋ectivewa< to fortify North China四 dMongkiang area in 
order to make preparations for the war with Russia. See Daihonei Rikugun-bu, 
Vol I, P. 436. 
148. Generally speaking, the Prime Mmister stood institutionally“at the head of the 
Ministers of State”and had “general control over the various branches of 
administration.＇’ But in pracbce，血ePnme Minister’s power was senously 
restricted m several respects For 開閉1ple，血eWar Minister and the Naval 
MinISter we回 notnece"arily under the control of由ePrime Mmister, not to 
speak of both Chiefs of the General Stafs Both Service Ministers were, in fact, 
intimidating血eexistence of the Cabinets by givmg担theirresignations if they 
wished 
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could compete.・ He was a young Prince who was a remote relal!ve of the 
Emperor and enjoyed great popularity in various circles, including the 
m出tary,to say no白血Eof the public. Though his political acumen was 
stil unknown, he was regarded as the hope of the political world. In fact, 
before the formation of the Konoye Cabinet, the then W町 Minister
General Sugiy町 a・said that也ewhole Army would support Prince 
Konoye.149 Prince Konoye, however, sensed that to be well received by 
every circle meant that no one would actually support him, and that he 
nught become a marionette of the military. 150 In fornung出eCabmet he 
actually had to make a concess10n to吐ieArmy’s demand由atBaba be 
accepted as a Cabinet Minister. 151 In order to further its interests the 
Army, it is assumed, could take advantage of his prestige and popularity. 
百 esemight have been his disadvantages but they could be changed mto 
the bargaining advantages if they were combmed with another factor, i.e., 
skil and will in using them as bargaining advantages It is said, however, 
血at世田 Pr加celacked the will and skil and was not good at working on 
o也ersin a political sense.152 This did not mean that he did not try to get 
his desired result. It was true that he made efforts to restrain the military. 
His maneuver, however, was not o do the ]Ob by himself, but to get o吐iers
149. Harada, opαt., VoL VI, p. 5. At that time, Lt-General Ushiroku，由ethen 
Chief of出eMilitary Afa!IS Bureau propo記dKonoye as Prime Minister，岨dso 
did General Terauchi. See Harada, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 311. 
150. Baba, Kogo, Konoye Naikaku Shi Ron (The History of由eKonoye Cabinets), 
Takayama Shorn, 1946, pp. 50-1 Kisha, Ikusaburo, KonoyekoH1bun (The 
Secret Sto可 ofPrince Konoye), Koy出血 ShuppanSha, 1950, p. 5 Yabe, op. 
cit., pp 323-4 
151. At first, the Army demanded that Baba become Finance Minister. But he was 
very unpopul世間出血efmancial circle, so Konoye picked him田 Home
Mmister Yabe. op. cit ,pp. 381-2 
152 Showa Dojm Kai ed., Showa Ken砂uKai (Showa Research Society), Keizai 
Orai Sha, 1968, pp. 256 8 Incidentally, it seems出ateven in由e1930’s there 
was stil・ a litle room for the Emperor to assume leadership as shown出血e
February 26 Incident of 1936, if he wished Yet, Premier Konoye hated to 
utilze白eEmperor's leadership in order to get the Army under his control, 
which w田 totalyinconsistent with his highest value, i.e. preservation of血e
national policy -the Emperor. 
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to do it on behalf of himself. That was his style.153 Therefore it was・ not 
surprising that he was considered to be a man who was flattenng, and 
readily giving way to the military目154 Unless his wil to use his bargaining 
advantages as such was perceived by other players, they by no m回目
constituted his bargaining advantages. Jn tlus respect, what other players 
considered lum to be was critically important. In considering his stakes 
and stand, we should not overlook the time factor It was about a month 
after the fonuation of his Cabinet that the incident broke out. Time was 
not in favor of the Prem10r. It 1s, therefore, easily assumed that he was not 
well prepared to cope with the issue. What is more, his unpreparedness, it 
seems, was closely related to the facts that he had not been suf白ciently
experienced in actual politics, and that he had reluctantly accepted the 
second mandate to assume prenuership. 
Unlike Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Hirota had years of 
experience in actual politics not only as Foreign Minister but also as Pnme 
Minister. Jn 1935 as Foreign Minister of廿ieOkada Cabinet, he took the 
diplomatic initiative to normalize the relations with China by putting 
forward 
only when the Army and the Navy supported it, or at least when t』ieydi d 
not find their inter田tsin opposing it.15 Although the Foreign Minister in 
general was, m form and m practice, restncted in exercising his influence 
to guide the formation of Japan’s foreign policy, the extent to which he 
could get his desired result depended considerably upon not only his 
competence but also upon what other players considered him. What they 
considered him was, of course, affected by both what he had done and 
what he was determined to do. It was the Hirota Cabinet of 1936 that 
restored the Imperial Ordinance of 1900 which required that both Service 
Ministers be restncted to general officers on active duti田.As well known, 
153. Kon'oye once told Genro Sarnji about his view that, if a party Cabinet四 d
parliamentary politics were not mamtamed, responS1b1lity should be assumed 
by the militarists though it w田veryrisky Yabe, op. cit., p. 215, 381. See also 
fn. 108. 
154.“Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Oto-roku，＇’ op. cit., p. 416. 
155. Taiheiyかsensoe no Mfchi, Vol. I, p. 127-32. 
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it literally gave吐iepower to overthrow the Cabinets to the military. 
τ'herefore Foreign Minister Hirota of the Konoye Cabinet was regarded as 
a man who readtly gave way to the military156 He had years of experience 
both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister and should have known 
what politics was, but he never tried to show his will and skil either m 
working on like-minded players or in forming an alliance m order to get his 
desired result. In this respect, he seriously lacked the bargaining 
advantages官官 factthat both Prime Mimster and Foreign Minister lacked 
wil and skil in using them as bargaining advantages could partly explain 
why they could not form an alliance between them although b加e
Minister Konoye had picked Hirota as Foreign Minister and both of them 
wanted an early settlement of the incident. Therefore al that Foreign 
Mimster Hirota actually did was to reluctantly approve the mobilization 
proposal. 
We have血usfar described the process of the decision game and several 
important players’stakes and st阻むwhichaggregated to the outcome, i.e., 
the July 11也 Statement.And we have noticed that the decision was made 
not by th~ “rational”calculation of the palyers but by the “pulling and 
hauling”among them目 Wehave also found that there were several 
important actions of both governmen臼. For ex田nple，吐ieKwantung 
Army’s action of July 8, wluch constituted an action game, seems to have 
confirmed吐ieChinese War Minister's perception that the Kwantung Army 
had engmeered廿ieincident, and to have encouraged the advocates for war 
加由eNationalist Government. Pressed hard by them as weli as by the 
Chinese Commumst Party, Chiang Kai-shek was driven to issue the order 
to dispatch the troops northward ..百世saction of Chiang Kai-shek turned 
吐iebalance of the decision game泊 favor of廿leadvocates for 
mobilization. Then the players’stakes and st四 dsdescribed above 
produced the July 11th Statement. 
156. Ishti, op. cit., p. 236-7 Colonel Kawabe of the Army General Staff once 
advised Fo毘ignMinister Hirota that he should not completely obey the A回1y
血d血steadshould do what he th凹 ghtright由oughit might be dificult田
Foreign Minister.“Kawabe Tor酷hiroShosho Kaiso Oto-roku，”op cit., p 416 
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The July 11th Statement, in fact, w田 aresultant of也eJapanese 
恒也ma!politics in several important respects. Alth叩 ghM句orGeneral 
Ishiwara had competence and also wil and skil in using them as bargaining 
advantages, he failed to make them ef白ctive,or could not form an 
alliance.百四nhe had to succumb to吐ieadvocates for mobtl1zation due to 
出epressure both from them and from his posit10n.官10War Min"ster, who 
lacked confidence and knowledge about世田issue,persistently presented 
世田 mobilizationproposal on behalf of the Army which was naturally 
represented by those who argued confidently with infll}ence. The Naval 
Minister had no reason to decline by al means the War Minister's proposal 
partly because the proposal had a plausable reason to save 5,500 soldiers 
of the North China Army from annilillation，回dpartly because the Navy’s 
interests were not directly involved. Those who coltld make other players 
believe廿ieirargument reasonable and unrefuted did w泊 thegame. Neither 
the Foreign Mirnster nor the Prime M凶sterwho comparatively had 
barg厄ningadvantages argued confidently with influence, which was 
however restricted mstitutionally .157 Due to the lack of knowledge about 
the issue, the Prime Minister had to comply with the War Minister.158 
The summary description presentβd above has not yet given a 
satisfactory阻 swerto也epuzzle why the July 11th Statement was 
necessary and had to be announced at that time when an agreement was to 
be concluded on the spot. As already described, Pnme Minister Konoye 
feared that it would eventually lead to the Cabinet collap田 ifhe o句ected
ag厄nstthe War Minister's proposal. But why did he go so far描 to
officially回 nounce吐ieStatement? Was 1t impossible for him to keep it 
unstated？’The Prime Minister, in fact, had two objectives. The first one 
was directed to Clnna in order to settle the incident as already descnbed. 
Affected not only by his lack of knowledge about the issue bnt also by 
others who argued confidently with influence, the b加eMinister believed 
血atChina would surely succumb if Japan sholtld take a firm st皿ceby 
157 The fact由atMajor General Ishiwara gave面，也ewnter assumes, probably 
affected曲eirst叩 ds.
158. N出himoto,op. cit., p 174. 
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officially announcing吐iedispatch of troops. The second one, which seems 
more important, was related to the Japanese internal politi回 andalso to 
the Premier’s maneuvers Since Prime M1mster Konoye and his aides 
也oughtthat the mihtary had always taken the initiative in every event, 
the Prime Minister held an idea that he should first of al mobilize the 
public support so as to check the military and thus to setle the issue 
effectively. And what he actually did was to get the better of由emilitary 
by issuing the Mobihzat10n Statement of July 11 159 Therefore, the 
Statement had to be announced at that very moment by al means. 
Lastly we may as well briefly refer to the effects of the July 11th 
Statement百四 Statementencouraged the advocates for forceful measures 
both in Japan and in China We know about the action game which 
appeared as the broadcast of the Press Section of the War Ministry. The 
Press Section forced every newspaper to keep the news of the cease.fire 
agreement concluded on July 11. Consequently, al the newspapers of July 
12 except for Asah{dealt with the local agreement very briefly, and 
instead wrote up the statement concerning the dispatch of troops to North 
Chma 160 Both political parties, Mmseito and Se1yukai, gave ful support 
to the Govemment decision on the night of July 11 and the followmg 
day 161 Although the North China Army was comparallvely well under 
the. leadership of M吋orGeneral Hashimoto Gun, there existed, it is said, 
such advocates for drastic measures as had delayed the reception and 
dispatch of the telegrams about non exp阻 s1on.162 Therefore, 1t is 
undemable that the statement encouraged them and made the acllvities of 
the Japanese representallves on出espot very dif日cultMeanwhile, the 
Statement of the Japanese Government was delivered to the conference at 
Kuling on July 12, getting the participants there excited.163 Asked to 
participate m the Nat10nal Defense Conference about that time, Chou En-
lai said that吐ieChmese Communist Army would JOin血eresistance to 
159 Ishi, op cit., p. 240 
160 Hata, op. cit, pp 234, 236 and fn. 2 inp 237. 
161. Ibid., p 353 
162. Imai, op. cit, p. 30, 32. 
163. Ibid., p. 35. 
173 
Japan if Chiang Kai-shek started it. 1叫 Opposmgto many moderates, Feng 
Chih-an shared the view with the Communist Party and advocated the war 
with Japan 165 In such a situation, Chiang Kai-shek reportedly consulted 
with top officials, such as Wang Ching-wei, Cheng Chien, Chen Cheng on 
the afternoon of July 12，皿darrived at a conclusion that they epare 
both for war and peace, and that in case of need they dare to fight.出
164. Ibid. 
165. Ibid. 
16. Daihonez Rikugun-bu,Vol. I, p. 442 
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北支事変一官僚政治モデルを通して
〈要約〉
井上真蔵
本稿は，太平洋戦争1:至る過程での重大な事件の一つである北支事変
をグレアム・アリソンにより提示された官僚政治（bureaucraticpolitics) 
モテツレにより分析し，新たな解釈の可能性とともに官僚政治モテツレの有
効性をも探求しようとするものである。対象期間は1937年7月7日より
8月15日までであるが，スペースの都合により後半部は次回に譲りたい。
第一章では，蓮溝橋事件が主1:組織過程の視点より考察される。事件
勃発前よ q，参謀本部，陸軍省，北支軍は事件を示唆するようなングナ
ノレを受けとっていたが，乙れらのシグナノレの発生1:は，それなりの原因
が幸子在したのである。間接的1:は，日本の行なった一連の華北分離政策
がその原因であるが，直接的には，関東軍の華北進出を阻止するために
北支軍が二倍l己増強されたためと，昼夜を関わずの連日の演習によるた
めであった。そして，豊台が増強の場所に選ばれたが，乙れは軍事的と
いうよりはむしろ政治的な意図によるものであった。また北支軍の演習
は対ソ戦1:備えてのものであり，且つ7月が中隊教練の完成の時期にあ
たっており単に中国側のシグナルのために演習を中止するわけにはいか
なかった。
乙のように，北支軍の増強は陸軍内部の政治的結果1:他ならず，北支
軍の演習も対ソ戦を目指してのノレーティーンな行動1:すぎなかった。しか
し，中国側はそれを知る由もなく，日本軍の華北への進出と受けとった
のである。その結果，前述のシグナルが現われたのであるが，それは石
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原作戦部長等の注意を喚起したにもかかわらず，極東I＜＇.於いて日本の脅
威となったソ連を重視するあまり，変化する状況に対処させるまでには
いかなかった。要するに，日本陸軍の内的調整と北支軍のJレーティーン
な行動とが産溝橋事件をもたらしたものと言えよう。
第三章では， 7月11日の華北派兵IL関する政府声明が各プレーヤーの，
いかなる反応，利害，立場から生じたかが分析される。参謀本部の武藤
作戦課長，陸軍省の田中軍事課長は，乙れを機会1'.華北問題の解決を計
り，動員案を強硬に支持したが，それは彼らの選好順位のみならず彼ら
が公的に動員案を実施する立場にあったζとにも関係しているように思
われる。また参謀本部の河辺大佐，堀場大佐，陸軍省の柴山大佐は動員
案1'.は反対であったが，武藤，田中両課長を始めとし，実際l乙情報，作
戦起案を担当する；；｝ュニア・プレーヤーが動員案を支持した。乙のため，
状況認識に欠く杉山陸相は実質的影響力を持つ彼らの意見を主張する ζ
とになったのである。石原は作戦部長として動員案には絶対反対であっ
たが，参謀本部をまとめる Eとは出来ず，特に部下武藤の強い圧力のた
めに，結局，動員案I＜＇.反対するわけにはいかなかった。
海相は，華北派兵は全面戦争1'.至る虞があるため反対したが，北支軍
と居留民を見殺に出来ずとの陸相の主張1'.は敢て反対は出来なかった。
それは海軍としての利益が含まれていないせいでもあった。
外務省は動員1'.反対であったが，広田外相は閣議において十分にその
意思を表明しなかった。近衛首相も絶対に反対であったにもかかわらず，
反対は陸相の辞任を招き，延いては内閣の崩壊に至ることを恐れて結局
は動員案を承認したのである。
以上の結果， 11日の声明が生れたのではあるが，より直接的には首相
のスタイルによると乙ろ大であると思われる。状況認識を欠く近衛首相
は中国に圧力をかければ問題は解決すると信じ，声明を出すことにより
軍部の先手壱取り問題を解決しようとしたのである。乙のような意味で
7月11日の声明は日本政府内部の政治的結果であったと言えよう。
